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Abstract
As the EU low cost airline sector matures, consolidation is expected. This paper details a three-
stage methodology to examine LCCs mergers and acquisition activity. A series of depth
interviews with aviation experts concludes that the motives for LCCs to enter mergers and
acquisitions are largely similar to those of full service carriers. A key success factor for merging
partners is to have similar business models and culture. An analysis of full service and low cost
carrier mergers and acquisition activity events shows that the size ratio and degree of network
overlap between merging airlines are also independent of airline type. Braxton and BCG
analyses of EU LCCs show Ryanair and EasyJet to be the only LCCs in the market with strong
strategic positions across the markets they serve. Finally, an application of the Product and
Organisation Architecture analytical approach was used to compare seven EU LCCs. EasyJet
and Vueling were found to have the most similar business models and were therefore considered
the best strategic fit for a potential merger.
1 Introduction
Since the 1980’s, two important aviation trends have dominated air transport research: airline
market consolidation and the growth of low-cost carriers. However, very little research has
considered the merger and acquisition activity of low cost airlines. This paper sets out to address
merger and acquisition activity within the LCC sector with a focus on the EU market.
The liberalisation of the intra-EU air services market provided the legislative framework in
which low cost carriers (LCCs) could develop. The ‘Third Package’ of aviation measures came
into force in January 1993, with full cabotage following in 1997. This market liberalisation
allowed airlines to operate between any points in the European Union (EU). These new
regulations have had a similar effect to the deregulation of the US domestic market some twenty
years earlier. US deregulation saw the establishment and growth of Southwest Airlines, the
archetypal low cost carrier.
Ryanair was the first EU airline to take advantage of the new European regulatory environment.
The company based its strategy on the successful Southwest model, which quickly proved to
work perfectly well in Europe. Soon after, start-ups like EasyJet and Debonair also launched
low-cost services. Many legacy carriers reacted to the threat of low-fare airlines by establishing
their own LCC subsidiaries (including BA’s Go and KLM’s Buzz), yet, most did not succeed
(Francis et al. 2005). After a few years, the market went through an initial wave of consolidation.
2Market leaders Ryanair and easyJet both acquired smaller competitors, Buzz and Go respectively,
whilst many other small carriers collapsed (Danklefsen, 2007). By 2011, one hundred and ten
low cost carriers had entered the EU market but only thirty-two survived (Mason, et al., 2013).
The rest had either gone out of business, been acquired or had merged with a competitor.
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are means of rapidly achieving external corporate expansion
and growth (Tickle 1987). As companies merge, their resources are conjoined to increase the
value in the combined business. The sources of added value are synergies found either on the
revenue or cost side of the business. Revenue enhancements can be achieved in a merged
company through the growth in scale of the business (Dobson and Piga, 2009), increased market
power, increased product attractiveness, or access to scarce resources. Sources for cost synergies
include removal of overlapping areas, efficiency gains (economies of scale, scope, density and
learning), and tax benefits (Maruna 2008, Merkert and Morrell 2012).
Historically, global M&A activity has tended to follow patterns of “waves”, with periods of
increased M&A activity, followed by periods of relative steadiness or declines (Sudarsanam
2003). Wang (2012) found airline merger activity tended to be cyclical and one significantly
large merger may trigger a number of others in a region. The consensus view of a number of
airline experts was that only two or three large low cost carriers will dominate the European
market by 2015 (Mason and Alamdari, 2007). The consolidation trend towards a limited number
of big LCC was also highlighted by Danklefsen (2007) in a study for the European Parliament
and by Graham and Shaw (2008)
Whilst mergers offer opportunities to raise revenue and reduce costs, such opportunities are not
automatically realised. Post-merger integration is the most crucial phase in the airlines’ merger,
considering strategic fit, revenue and cost synergies and cultural fit as the more important
parameters for a successful merger (Maruna, 2008). Hanson et al. (2002) highlighted a number
of reasons for failure of airline mergers including poor planning and execution, complexities
caused by the labour component of the merger, and lack of familiarization with the business
model of acquired company
Over the past three decades analysis of airline consolidation as a function of deregulation and
liberalisation, and the expansion of LCC sector, have developed parallel to one another. However,
as the LCC sector is maturing, consolidation among this group of airlines is expected. There is
lack of the systematic research on mergers of low cost carriers. Here we consider whether LCC
mergers differ in any substantive way from the merger of full service carriers and to look at the
likelihood of merger activity in the EU market and which carriers are most likely to be involved
in such activity.
2 Methodology
To investigate mergers and acquisition impacts a multi-stage methodology is employed.
A panel of ten aviation experts were interviewed between May and July 2012 to gather opinions
from a variety of aviation professionals with experience in LCC mergers. These included three
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at LCCs. There was a focus to interview respondents who were involved in one of the following
mergers: Ryanair/Buzz, easyJet/Go or Vueling/Clickair. Despite several attempts, contact with
Ryanair could not be established. Respondents were asked a series of open-ended questions
regarding the reasons for an airline to merge with or acquire another airline, the key
characteristics of a target partner and issues that may impact the success of a merger. The
responses were un-prompted. Following the interviews the responses to each question were
categorised and frequencies calculated to identify the key responses to each question. The
responses gaining three or more un-prompted responses were considered to be important.
To identify the general patterns of low-cost carriers M&As, recent airline mergers were analysed.
Thirty-nine airline mergers (including both full service and LCC) were identified and
investigated with respect of the relative size of the airlines merged, and the extent of network
overlap. An airline’s network structure is an essential feature for distinguishing low-cost airlines
from traditional carriers. Dobruszkes (2006) provided a detailed analysis of the network
structures of European LCC and provides an important framework analysing an airline’s size and
network. The M&A incidents investigated occurred between the Southwest’s acquisition of
Morris Air in 1993 and concluding with Southwest’s merger with Air Tran in 2011. A full list of
mergers/acquisitions is listed in Appendix 1.
Data for the analysis of the size and network was drawn from the Official Airline Guide database
(FlightGlobal, 2012), which provides a detailed and disaggregated description of the airlines’
supply of capacity. For each merger data were collected on: the acquirer: operations (aircraft
movements), seats and ASKs, the target airline: operations, seats and ASKs, and network
overlap: airports served, routes and seats on overlapping routes
For analyses, each metric was examined but an aggregated single measure, which would take
into account both the differences in aircraft size and the stage length is preferred. As a
consequence, an airline size parameter is developed for each airline engaged in a merger:
The powers applied to each item reflect the difference in magnitude of each metric. Subsequently,
a size ratio for each merger was calculated, to assess the relative size of merger partners to each
other. (The acquirer always refers to the larger airline, however in some cases, the merged
entities used the name of the smaller partner.)
Network Overlap was the final parameter to be assessed. There were various measures that could
have been used to express this value. Overlap is assessed by looking at three items: airports,
routes and network seats.
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airports served by both airlines. Routes Overlap indicates the number of routes (O-D) were
carriers compete, in relation to number of routes being operated. Finally, the Seats Overlap seeks
to explain how many seats are being operated on the overlapping routes. Each parameter implies
important operational consequences for the merging airlines. For example, the high Airport
Overlap, means that facilities and services might be shared. The Routes Overlap illustrates how
the network may expand after a merger, while the Seats Overlap describes how direct
competition between two airlines might change. Finally Network Overlap was calculated as the
mean of the three previous components. The following equations provide the methodology of
Network Overlap calculations:
Following the analysis of the relative size and degree of network overlap, an analysis of the
strategic need for an airline to merge was examined. Merger activity may be expected when a
market reaches maturity and therefore provides limited potential for organic growth. At this stage,
mergers provide an opportunity to achieve the size, economies of scale and market power needed
to compete with equally strong competitors (Tickle 1987).
To examine the market situation with respect to market development both Braxton and Boston
Consulting Group analyses were conducted. Both approaches place emphasis on the competitive
dynamics of the industry. For each analysis the market growth rate and relative market share
were examined. Growth was assessed by examining the annualised average increase in available
seats from 2006 to 2011. The relative market share was examined in 2011. The data required to
develop the analyses were obtained from the OAG. To examine the markets for each low cost
carrier, the European market was divided into seven approximately equally sized geographical
regions (Table 1).
Table 1 about here
Strategic fit is an important factor during a merger partner/acquisition target airline partner
selection process, and to investigate which airlines would be a good fit with each other, the key
elements of airlines’ business models need to be identified and compared. The applicability of
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partner identification process was investigated to see whether it is a suitable approach to compare
strategic fit for merger partners. This was undertaken using ex-post analysis of the Southwest
and AirTran merger, and the approach selected to conduct an ex-ante analysis of the key LCCs in
Europe.
The POA analysis covers two sets of data: 2010 US low-cost carriers and 2011 European low-
cost carriers. The sample from US includes seven biggest players: Southwest, AirTran, JetBlue,
Frontier, Spirit, Allegiant and Virgin America. The sample of EU airlines includes: Ryanair,
easyJet, airberlin, Norwegian, Vueling Airlines, Aer Lingus and flybe.
The following weights (Table 2) were applied to the benchmark items. The weights as previously
explained in Mason and Morrison (2009) are based on the correlation of each benchmark item
against profitability. The data used to calculate these weights include the US 2010 data, the EU
2011 data and also the dataset used to calculate the weights included in the earlier study. These
new weights reflect a greater data set than was used in Mason and Morrison (2009). The
highlighted figures represent the items that have the greatest impact on LCC profitability.
Table 2 about here
To examine the strategic fit of the airlines for potential merger or acquisition a Similarity Index
was developed. The application of the POA model means that the business models of potential
merger partners may be expressed numerically. Once the final index scores for each airline are
calculated, the carriers can be easily compared. To find which airlines have the most similar
business models, the index score differences in each category were calculated. The sum of
differences gives the Similarity Index Score as shown in Equation 7. It is assumed, that the
smaller the Similarity Index Score, the easier two airlines can integrate into one unit.
To test the validity of using the POA model and the Similarity Index to examine potential merger
partners strategic fit, a post-ante examination of the business models of Southwest and Air Tran
prior to their merger in 2011.
Figure 1 about here
From the diagram the differences between the business models of merging partners can be
visually identified. To measure the differences more precisely the difference for each index score
for the two airlines was calculated and summated. The overall Similarity Index score was
calculated as 22.8. The highest contribution to the overall difference comes from connectivity
1 The POA business model analytical tool is based on “best-in-class” benchmark comparisons of all airlines within
an analysis. Full details of the methodology and application can be found in Mason and Morrison (2009).
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as the next largest airline in the analysis.
The use of the POA model facilitates the comparison of the merger partners and helps to identify
the areas that might be difficult to integrate. For Southwest/AirTran none of these were real
threats to the success of the merger. Many of the other differences between Southwest and Air
Tran, especially the aircraft and comfort indices, are because AirTran uses the smaller Boeing
717. Within months after the merger a decision about a transition to a single aircraft type was
released (FlightGlobal 2012).
Table 3 about here
The same method of comparison was employed to examine all the possible merger combinations.
For Southwest Airlines, AirTran was the airline with the closest business model fit, although
JetBlue might also be a future target. The results provide verification of the proposition, that
POA model might be successfully used to find the most suitable airline partners and
consequently it was decided to use this approach to examine potential merger partners in the EU
LCC market.
3 Results
Expert interviews on LCCs and M&A activity.
Ten experts in LCC M&A activity were interviewed to explore some key areas of low-cost
carriers mergers. Asked the principal reasons an LCC may seek to merge with a potential partner
or acquire a competitor, the respondents indicated that network growth, to remove competition,
gain access to new markets, and relieve economic pressure were the main drivers. The responses
were un-prompted and the table shows the number of respondents who mentioned each item.
Only items that were mentioned by three or more of the experts were included in Figure 2.
Figure 2 about here
When asked to identify the key characteristics of any potential merger partner or acquisition
target, the industry experts highlighted fleet compatibility, business culture and network
advantages as the most important. Experts concluded that airlines should primarily search for
business model fit and network characteristics of the potential merger partner (Figure 3). These
findings are consistent with those of Maruna (2008) who investigated the topic of airline mergers
in general.
Figure 3 about here
The experts were then asked to name key sources of synergy as two LCCs merge. They indicated
that head-office rationalisation, network optimisation and leveraging greater purchasing power
were the principal benefits. Only two respondents mentioned higher yields or load factors. When
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responses was for a view that consolidation in the sector was expected.
Network size and merger analysis
An analysis of 39 full service and low cost carrier merger or acquisitions was used to examine
patterns in airline M&A activity and identify any differences in merger activity between the
airline types.
It is not surprising that mergers between full service carriers were identified as being between
larger carriers than those between low cost carriers2. The full service carriers (FSCs) acting as
acquirers were on average 50% larger in comparison with low-cost carriers that acquired or
merged with other LCCs. The same trend was observed among those airlines targeted for
acquisition. On average the targets of LCC mergers were three times smaller than airlines that
were bought by full-service carriers. This analysis was conducted on the aggregate size metric
developed in the methodology. Tests conducted across operations, seats, and ASKs, for both
acquirers and targets produced similar results, giving some confidence that the metric is an
adequate aggregate measure of an airline’s size. It seems possible that the difference in size is
more likely a result of the maturity of both types of airlines. Full-service carriers operate in more
mature, less fragmented markets, in line with the qualitative results of the interviews.
An airline’s business model was shown to have no impact on the average size ratio of a target
airline to its acquirer. The ratio of the target and acquirer airlines, at 0.42, is not affected by the
airline’s business model, with the average ratio being statistically similar for both low-cost and
network carriers. Table 4 provides a summary of the size parameters of the analysed mergers
between low-cost carriers, including the size ratios between acquirer airline and target. The
mergers were classified in regard to the size ratio of merging partners (Sudrasanam, 2003). A
“Takeover” is where there is a great difference in size between the two airlines (ratio< 0.16).
Most of the cases were categorised as an “acquisition” where the target company became
incorporated by the acquirer. Only a few examples could be classified as a “merger of equals”
where the size ratio was higher than 0.70.
Table 4 about here
Network overlap is one of the most important factors to be considered during merger evaluation
(Maruna 2008, Iatrou and Oretti 2007). Again a series of t-tests were conducted on network
overlap, airport overlap, and routes and seats overlaps and no statistical differences were found
between full service and low cost airlines. The average network overlap of the sample was 0.15,
however, the values were reasonably equally distributed across a range between 0.05 and 0.25.
Table 5 summarises the network overlap of the low-cost carrier mergers in the sample set. It can
be seen, that the network overlap was not the main motive for easyJet and Ryanair’s acquisitions.
Indeed experts who were engaged in these mergers, stated that access to the slots at Gatwick and
2 A two-tailed t-test found a significant difference in the size of merging partners depending on the operating model
(full service airline or LCC).
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ClickAir and Vueling was rather different. Before consolidation, these two airlines were the
biggest competitors in Barcelona airport but neither was profitable. “Previous failing business
route” is one of the methods to persuade authorities to support a merger decision (Fageda and
Perdiguero, 2011, Fragkogianni, 2012). These airlines gained the approval to integrate their
services in 2009 even with their high network overlap, however, the European Commission
conditioned its decision on the number of remedies including giving up some of their landing
slots. The Commission believed that these remedies were likely to facilitate entry for other
competitors, thus maintaining competitive pressure on the merged entity (EC, 2009).
Table 5 about here
Strategic fit analysis of EU LCCs merger partners
The expansion of LCCs in Europe developed quickly following the full liberalisation of the
market in 2001, some 20 years after a similar trend occurred in the United States. The European
market is far less concentrated than the US. The three biggest players, namely Ryanair, easyJet
and airberlin jointly supply over half of the seats, whereas in the United States the market share
of the largest three LCCs exceeds 80%. However, the European low-cost airline market is
gradually maturing (Francis et al., 2005, de Wit and Zuidberg, 2012). According to the industry
life cycle hypothesis, when a market approaches the maturity stage, increased levels of M&A
activity might occur. It is therefore possible that a wave of mergers may occur in the EU airline
sector as it matures.
To examine the possible outcome of such a round of M&A activity in the EU LCC market, it is
necessary to investigate whether the studied airlines have potential reasons for entering a merger.
According to the expert depth interviews the main motives pushing low-cost airlines to merge
are for growth, competitive position, to gain access to markets and economic pressure. The
position of a number of EU LCCs has been examined in these areas.
Figure 4 illustrates a Braxton analysis of the relative performance of the nine largest European
low cost carriers. Three groups of airlines can clearly be seen. The first group consists of ‘market
leaders’ (Ryanair, EasyJet and Air Berlin). During the 2006-2011 period the three biggest
carriers grew approximately at the average rate for the industry. The second group covers the
‘followers’. These airlines (Nowegian, Vueling and Aer Lingus), although smaller in size, were
growing much quicker than the rest of the industry. The remaining airlines (Wizz, Flybe, and
germanwings), did not grow much, focusing on niche markets (Eastern Europe, regional and
German leisure markets respectively).
Figure 4 about here
To analyse the competitive position of each airline, a Boston Consulting Group analysis was
conducted on the sample airlines. The services of each airline in seven European markets were
calculated (refer to table 1 for the classification of the regions). Table 6 provides details of the
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growth in 2010/11.
Table 6 about here
Table 7 about here
The Boston Consulting Group Product Portfolio Matrix can be used to develop appropriate
strategies for the business streams a company has. In theory, ‘cash cows’ (that enjoy high market
share but in low growth markets) are the products that offer the highest returns and do not
requiring significant additional investment. To achieve the sustainable position, companies
should try to have a balanced portfolio, consisting of ‘cash cows’, ‘stars’ (potential ‘cash cows’
of the future) and some ‘question marks’ (investment support may enable these to be the ‘stars’
of the future).
Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 illustrates an application of the product portfolio to Ryanair’s business by regions. It can
be noticed that the airline has a very strong position in the UK region. In 2011, the output of
‘Star’ products was increased by approximately 20%, while the number of seat from East Europe
region increased by 5%. At the same time, Ryanair reduced the number of flights to Germany
region by one quarter, possibly in response to high competition or perhaps increased costs.
Regarding the two reaming regions, the airline maintained its status quo. The competitive
situation for easyJet is illustrated in Figure 6. Apart of their home market, the airline does not
have a particularly strong position in any of the regions. Yet, in 2011, easyJet increased its
presence in each market, focusing the growth in France and Germany, where Ryanair has a
weaker position.
Figure 6 about here
None of the other airlines had a significant position in more than one region, which would justify
the production of a separate BCG graph. Instead, all of them were displayed in the one matrix
highlighting each airline’s position in its largest market. As can be seen in the Figure 7, none of
the airlines have ‘cash cow’ products in their product portfolios.
Figure 7 about here
According to the industry experts, an airline’s financial situation is one of the key drivers for a
carrier to merge. In, 2009 two failing airlines, Vueling and Clickair merged into one entity. Since
the merger, the combined airline has remained profitable. Table 8 summarises the market
position and operating ratio of the sample airlines along with and possible strategic options for
their markets. Where airlines are losing money, it is more likely that they will be in a weaker
position, and may become an acquisition target.
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Given the size and its strong position in the European market, it is not very likely that Ryanair
would benefit from a merger with any smaller and weaker carrier. In the long term though, the
airline could benefit from a merger with Aer Lingus. This merger would give the Ryanair access
to resources and “know-how” needed to start long haul operations if the short haul market
becomes saturated. Yet, a merger between these two carriers is unlikely, as the European
Commission has prohibited it due to the likely reduced levels of competition in the Irish market.
EasyJet has probably the highest motivation to grow through the merger. Despite being the
second biggest low-cost carriers airline, it still has not managed to secure a high market share in
many of its markets. The acquisition of a local leader could considerably strengthen its position.
The assessment of the competitive position of airberlin is rather complicated. According to
Klophaus et al. (2012) the airline’s business model is very close to that of a full-service carrier.
During an expert interview, Doganis noted that airberlin should not be considered as a low-cost
carrier anymore. The fact that the airline joined the oneworld alliance further support this
hypothesis. Moreover, 29.21% of airberlin is now owned by the Etihad (FlightGlobal Pro, 2012).
Consequently, it seems unlikely that airberlin will engage in a merger with any LCC in the near
future.
Norwegian, Vueling and WIZZ Air appear to be three well run, low-cost airlines. However, all
of them are geographically constrained. According to the experts’ opinion none of those airlines
have the scale or resources to be an important player at the European level. Thus it is very likely
that these airlines will be the potential targets or partners during the approaching consolidation.
The results of the strategic analysis suggest that that Aer Lingus, flybe and germanwings are not
in a position to be market leaders, focusing instead on their particular niche markets. Similar
opinions were offered in the expert depth interviews. One respondent gave the opinion that
germanwings is a tactical project of Lufthansa, developed as a response to the low-cost carrier
threat, rather than a strategic unit, focused on expansion.
Table 8 about here
The in-depth interviews with industry experts suggested business model fit is the most important
factor during the partner selection process. To assess the possible merger partners in the EU LCC
market, the similarity of the airlines’ business models were examined. The Product and
Organisation Architecture approach was used to systematically and numerically assess the
business model of each of the sample airlines and a Similarity Index calculated for each potential
merger pair (Table 9). Regrettably, the complete data for WIZZ Air and germanwings could not
be gathered, thus these airlines could not be included in the analysis.
To find the airlines with most similar business models, the similarity matrix was developed. The
lower the index value, the POA suggests the more similar the two airline business models are to
one another.
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Table 9 about here
It can be seen from the data in Table 10 that easyJet, Norwegian and Vueling have the most
similar business models. This also accords with the earlier observations, which showed that these
carriers have the strongest motives to merge. Whilst these three airlines have the most similar
business models, Air Berlin is also evaluated as being as similar to EasyJet and Norwegian as
Southwest was to Air Tran. However, given its recent moves towards a full service approach
(joining an alliance, and gaining financial support from Etihad) that it is unlikely to pursue a
merger with a LCC partner.
Table 10 about here
Figure 8 shows POA profile of EasyJet, Norwegian and Vueling. It is apparent that the most of
the differences between these airlines steams from the Connectivity and Airport Indices. This is a
result of the discrepancy of network sizes. EasyJet operates much larger networks, which
strongly affects the result. Norwegian and Vueling are jointly the leaders in terms of distribution
cost. However, those airlines operate mostly locally, thus do not have to invest so much to be
recognized in the wider market. Nevertheless, neither of these differences would critically affect
the merger decision.
The labour issues during the merger are one of the greatest challenges. Thus, it is particularly
important that the Labour Index scores of potential partners are quite similar.
Figure 8 about here
The conducted analyses allowed suggest easyJet and Vueling have the highest potential to merge
with each other. For easyJet, the potential merger would help to develop the strong position in
the Iberia region, while Vueling would benefit from the efficiency gains and higher market
power. The two airlines have very similar brand position and business models. They also operate
the same fleet of Airbus A320. The similarity in business model would facilitate the smooth
integration. Moreover, easyJet has already had the experience in the growth through the mergers.
Thus, it could take advantage of the valuable “know-how”, which would help to avoid the
pitfalls during the process. The approval issues should not be a major problem as the network
overlap is relatively small. The parameters of the potential merger are summarised in the
following table. The average values of past mergers were provided as a reference.
Table 11 about here
There are a number of factors favouring an easyJet/Vueling merger. Yet, Iberia, which owns
46% of Vueling, might want to prevented the acquisition and protect it home market. Whilst the
analysis placed both Vueling and Norwegian as merger targets, the very high degree of business
model similarity might suggest that these smaller carriers might consider a merger of equals,
although a recent large order of both narrow body and wide body aircraft by Norwegian suggests
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the airline is seeking to grow organically. The difference in fleet may provide an insurmountable
barrier in the path.
4 Conclusion
This paper has looked at LCC M&A activity to examine whether they are fundamentally
different from mergers between full services carriers. The in-depth interviews with industry
experts confirmed that the reasons for mergers of LCCs and that the challenges such events pose
are largely the same as mergers between full service carriers. The analysis of the previous M&A
events has also shown that there are no real differences in the relative position of target to its
acquirer. Whilst merger and acquisition strategies for European low cost carriers will clearly go
on behind closed doors, this paper has sought to develop a methodology by which likely partners
could be identified and the likely success of any merger might be evaluated. The fit between
merger partners’ strategies and business culture was confirmed as being a key determinant the
success of a merger. The POA approach has successfully been applied to as a tool to examine
airline business models and the fit between potential partners. As the EU LCC market reaches
maturity, it is likely that more mergers and acquisitions will occur. Having tools to assess the
probable outcomes will be useful to analysts and investors.
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APPENDIX Identified mergers
Year Partners TYPE
1993 Southwest Airlines/Morris Air LCC
1997 Valujet Airlines/AirTran LCC
1997 British Airways/Delta Air * FSC
1998 Delta Air Lines/Atlantic Southeast FSC
1998 American Airlines/Reno Air FSC
1999 Delta Air Lines/Comair Inc. FSC
1999 American Airlines/TWA FSC
2002 Ryanair/Buzz LCC
2002 easyJet/Go Fly LCC
2004 Copa Airlines/Aerorepublica FSC
2004 Air France/KLM FSC
2004 Atlantic Southeast/SkyWest Airlines FSC
2004 Deutsche BA/Germania LCC
2005 Lufthansa/Brussels Airlines FSC
2005 US Airways/America West Airlines FSC
2005 Maersk Air/Sterling LCC
2005 Republic Airways/Shuttle America * FSC
2006 airberlin/Deutsche BA LCC
2006 BA Connect/Flybe LCC
2007 Avianca/Taca FSC
2007 Norwegian/FlyNordic LCC
2007 easyJet/GB Air LCC
2007 airberlin/LTU LCC
2007 Indian Airlines/Air India FSC
2008 Lufthansa/BMI British Midland FSC
2008 Lufthansa/Austrian FSC
2008 Delta Air Lines/Northwest Airlines FSC
2008 Republic Airline/Midwest Airlines FSC
2008 ClickAir/Vueling Airlines LCC
2008 Kingfisher/Air Deccan FSC
2009 Republic Airline/Frontier FSC
2009 China Eastern Airlines/Shanghai Airlines FSC
2010 TAM/Lan Airlines FSC
2010 British Airways/Iberia FSC
2010 United Airlines/Continental FSC
2010 GOL/Webjet LCC
2011 Southwest Airlines/AirTran LCC
2011 Skyways/City Airlines * FSC
2011 TRIP/Azul Airlines LCC
*Mergers dropped from analysis due to lack of data
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Table 1: European regions and countries
Region Countries included Share
of seats
Iberia Gibraltar, Portugal, Spain & Canary Island 16%
France Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland 16%
Germany Austria, Germany 16%
UK Ireland, United Kingdom 15%
Italy Greece, Italy, Malta 14%
Eastern
Europe
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine
12%
Scandinavia Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 11%
Source: FlightGlobal, 2012
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Table 2: Weighting of benchmark items to profit
Benchmark Item Profit correlationWeights
Unit cost (per ASK) Euro cent 0.34
Yield per RPK (Euro cent) -0.08
Operating revenue per sector (Euro) -0.17
Average fare paid (Euro) (including ancillary revenue) -0.27
Network density – departures per airport per day 0.24
Routes offered 0.34
All destinations available at airports served Weighted average -0.10
Average weekly frequency per route 0.07
Airport location – average distance from nearest population centre (km) -0.12
Flights at primary airports (%) -0.07
OTP Punctuality (%) 0.00
Passengers per flight -0.39
Passengers per flight and cabin-crew members -0.68
Economy seat width (Inches) most pop a/c -0.35
Economy seat pitch (Inches) most pop a/c -0.01
Ticketing, sales, promotion per passenger (Euro) 0.51
Aircraft utilization (aircraft hours per day) -0.09
Most populous aircraft type/mark accounts for fleet (%) 0.16
Aircraft sectors per day 0.05
Passenger per employee 0.72
Employee per aircraft 0.53
Personnel cost per ASK 0.09
Flight and cabin crew/employees (%) 0.50
ASK per employee (’000) 0.62
Percent of city pair routes are monopolies (%) -0.02
Weighted average annual passenger at airports served (in millions) 0.26
No of network airlines at destination 0.42
Airport/en-route costs per passenger (Euro) 0.31
Median HHI on capacity (seat) 0.03
Average HHI on capacity (seat) 0.05
Average number of competitors per route 0.19
Capacity share of seats (%) 0.01
Average city size served -0.07
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Table 3: US LCCs’ similarity matrix
Southwest AirTran JetBlue Frontier Spirit Allegiant Virgin
Southwest 0 22.8 22.9 29.5 33.1 44.5 35.8
AirTran 22.8 0 15.4 28.7 22.2 32 28.2
JetBlue 22.9 15.4 0 30.2 22.4 29.8 23.2
Frontier 29.5 28.7 30.2 0 34.6 47.5 22.5
Spirit 33.1 22.2 22.4 34.6 0 17 28.1
Allegiant 44.5 32 29.8 47.5 17 0 41.7
Virgin 35.8 28.2 23.2 22.5 28.1 41.7 0
Table 4: Size parameters of past LCC mergers
Year Acquirer OPS103
Seats
106
ASK
109 Target
OPS
103
Seats
106
ASK
109 Size ratio Type
1993 Southwest 594 77 48 Morris Air 36 5 4 0.06
Takeover2011 GOL 294 49 45 Webjet 22 3 3 0.07
2007 easyJet 267 41 41 GB Air 21 3 7 0.09
2007 Norwegian 54 8 7 FlyNordic 10 2 1 0.17
Acquisition
2003 Ryanair 102 19 14 Buzz 20 2 2 0.18
2011 Southwest 1,156 162 173 AirTran 256 32 40 0.22
2007 airberlin 163 26 27 LTU 23 5 21 0.23
2006 airberlin 106 18 21 DBA 55 7 4 0.45
1997 Valujet 42 5 3 AirTran 20 2 3 0.51
2004 DBA 33 5 2 Germania 18 2 2 0.55
2003 easyJet 87 13 10 Go Fly 53 7 7 0.61
2005 Maersk Air 23 3 3 Sterling 13 2 4 0.68
2012 TRIP 139 9 5 Azul 94 10 9 0.73
Merger of equals2009 ClickAir 52 8 7 Vueling 47 8 8 0.95
2006 BA Connect 93 6 4 Flybe 87 8 4 0.97
Source: FlightGlobal, 2012
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Table 5: Network overlap of historical LCC mergers
Partners Airports Routes Seats Network overlap
Ryanair/Buzz 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
Norwegian/FlyNordic 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.07
easyJet/GB Air 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.07
airberlin/DBA 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.10
easyJet/Go Fly 0.24 0.02 0.05 0.10
Southwest/AirTran 0.28 0.05 0.07 0.13
Valujet/AirTran 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.14
Southwest/Morris Air 0.28 0.12 0.07 0.16
Maersk Air/Sterling 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.18
TRIP/Azul Airlines 0.34 0.06 0.17 0.19
airberlin/LTU 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.20
GOL/Webjet 0.17 0.15 0.33 0.21
BA Connect/Flybe 0.27 0.05 0.38 0.23
DBA/Germania 0.25 0.07 0.49 0.27
ClickAir/Vueling 0.40 0.18 0.48 0.35
Source: FlightGlobal, 2012
Table 6: Relative market share
Region Leader FR U2 AB DY VY EI W6 BE 4U
Iberia FR 1.66 0.40 0.23 0.04 0.53 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02
UK FR 1.10 0.91 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.36 0.08 0.49 0.02
Germany LH 0.15 0.09 0.60 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.20
Italy AZ 0.88 0.42 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03
France AF 0.26 0.45 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
East Europe SU 0.54 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.75 0.01 0.09
Scandinavia SK 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00
Table 7: Growth rate 2010/2011
Region FR U2 AB DY VY EI W6 BE 4U
Iberia 22% 11% -29% 13% 6% -2% 29% -19% 11%
UK -10% 5% -30% 28% -2% -4% 17% -2% 7%
Germany -25% 16% -8% 6% -16% 4% 3% -21% -4%
Italy 18% 7% -5% 13% -4% 4% 8% -3% 28%
France 0% 44% 1% 2% 28% 7% 5% 21% 3%
East Europe 5% 8% 5% -8% 17% -12% 12% x5 -15%
Scandinavia 0% 13% -1% 16% 0% 2% 14% x25 -2%
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Table 8: Summary of motives
Airline MergerMotive
Competitive
advantage
Operating
ratio
(2011)
Aggregate
Op.margin
(2008 -2011)
Potential merger
role
Ryanair Marketaccess
Strong
position 116% 11.90% Acquirer
easyJet Strengthenposition
Strong
position 108% 5.14% Acquirer
airberlin Strengthenposition Germany 94% -1.58%
Acquirer
/ Partner
Norwegian Growth Scandinavia 104% 2.53% Partner/ Target
Vueling Growth Iberia 101% 3.98% Target
Aer Lingus Niche Long-haul 104% 1.61% Target
WIZZ Air Growth East Europe 100% Not available Target
flybe Niche Aircraft size 100% -1.06% Target
germanwings Niche LufthansaGroup 93% -3.10%
LH asset
realisation
Source: Financial data – FlightGlobal, 2012
Table 9: Europe LCCs’ similarity matrix
Ryanair easyJet Norwegian Vueling flybe Aer Lingus airberlin
Ryanair 0 23.3 32.5 32 46.3 45.8 35.5
easyJet 23.3 0 15 13.1 36.8 33.7 22.5
Norwegian 32.5 15 0 8.8 37.2 24.9 22.5
Vueling 32 13.1 8.8 0 40.2 32.3 28.2
flybe 46.3 36.8 37.2 40.2 0 29.2 31.1
Aer Lingus 45.8 33.7 24.9 32.3 29.2 0 26.3
airberlin 35.5 22.5 22.5 28.2 31.1 26.3 0
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Table 10: easyJet/Norwegian/Vueling benchmark differences
Benchmark U2 DY VY U2/DY U2/VY
Profit 9.3 9.0 8.8 0.3 0.6
Cost 7.6 6.9 6.9 0.7 0.6
Revenue 5.9 6.8 5.7 0.8 0.2
Connectivity 7.7 3.2 4.0 4.5 3.7
Convenience 8.7 7.0 8.5 1.7 0.2
Comfort 4.2 5.2 3.1 1.0 1.0
Distribution 7.7 10.0 10.0 2.3 2.3
Aircraft 10.0 9.2 9.9 0.9 0.1
Labour 8.1 8.1 9.2 0.0 1.2
Airport 6.3 3.7 4.0 2.6 2.3
Market 6.4 6.6 5.5 0.3 0.9
Overall difference - - - 15.0 13.1
Table 11: easyJet/Vueling merger parameters
Parameter easyJet/Vueling Average
Acquirer Size 533 271(LCCs) 569 (FSCs)
Target Size 124 65 (LCCs) 183 (FSCs)
Size ratio 0.2 0.42
Airports overlap 0.32 0.26
Routes overlap 0.03 0.07
Seats overlap 0.06 0.15
Network overlap 0.14 0.15
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Figure 1: Product and Organisation Architecture: Southwest/AirTran
Figure 2: Reasons for LCCs to merge
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Figure 3: Key characteristics of potential M&A target/partner
Figure 4 : European LCC Sector Graph (Braxton Approach)
Figure 5: Ryanair Product portfolio matrix (BCG)
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Figure 6: easyJet Product portfolio matrix (BCG)
Figure 7: Other LCCs Product portfolio matrix
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Figure 8: Product and Organisation Architecture: easyJet/Norwegian/Vueling
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